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Radical Orthodoxy and Henri de Lubac 
 
 Simon Oliver 
Durham University 
 
The theological sensibility known as Radical Orthodoxy emerged in the 1990s 
amongst a group of theologians in the University of Cambridge. It quickly became 
one of the most influential and widely discussed strands in contemporary Christian 
theology, offering a bold new confidence (some would say hubris) in the face of the 
supposed decline of religion and the apparent hegemony of secular discourse. From 
its beginnings, Radical Orthodoxy understood itself as a variety of ressourcement 
theology, seeking to recover the riches of patristic and high medieval Christian 
orthodoxy in order to address contemporary theological, philosophical, political and 
cultural concerns. Although Radical Orthodoxy’s roots lie to some degree in the 
tradition of catholic Anglicanism, it is not an attempt to resource any particular 
church or denomination. One of Radical Orthodoxy’s most significant but easily 
overlooked achievements is the considerable attention it has drawn from a wide range 
of theological traditions, including Roman Catholicism, Orthodoxy and Reformed 
Protestantism. Add to this the significant conversations between Radical Orthodoxy 
and other disciplines and philosophical traditions, and one quickly realises its 
important contribution to our recent intellectual culture. 
 
Radical Orthodoxy has found natural allies amongst theologians and philosophers 
seeking to challenge the priorities and assumptions that are characteristic of modern 
and late modern thought. Amongst twentieth and twenty-first century figures, one 
might include Charles Péguy, Maurice Blondel, Karl Barth, Hans Urs von Balthasar, 
Louis Bouyer, Alasdair McIntyre and Charles Taylor. Most importantly, the 
perspective of Radical Orthodoxy is ‘in profound continuity with the French nouvelle 
théologie’ and none of the figures associated with that movement is more important 
than Henri de Lubac.1 He is the only modern thinker who has been the subject of a 
book-length treatment under the Radical Orthodoxy banner, namely John Milbank’s 
                                                          
1 John Milbank, Catherine Pickstock and Graham Ward, eds, Radical Orthodoxy: A New Theology 
(London: Routledge, 1999), 2. 
The Suspended Middle: Henri de Lubac and the Debate concerning the 
Supernatural.2 In an essay on the programme of Radical Orthodoxy, Milbank writes, 
 
Radical Orthodoxy considers that Henri de Lubac was a greater theological 
revolutionary than Karl Barth, because in questioning the hierarchical duality 
of grace and nature as discrete stages, he transcended, unlike Barth, the shared 
background assumption of all modern theology. In this way one could say, 
anachronistically, that he inaugurated a postmodern theology.3 
 
De Lubac has a pervasive influence in so many writings in the Radical Orthodoxy 
genre and the defence of de Lubac’s position on nature and grace has proved central 
to the various debates in which Radical Orthodoxy is most invested. 
 
In order to assess de Lubac’s considerable influence on Radical Orthodoxy, I will first 
offer a brief description of its key priorities and claims. This will include Radical 
Orthodoxy’s genealogy of the secular and its account of the tradition of patristic and 
Thomist theology which gave way to modernity. Having briefly established Radical 
Orthodoxy’s basic contours, this chapter will focus particularly on the debate 
concerning grace and nature. This is the arena in which Radical Orthodoxy has thus 
far engaged most thoroughly with de Lubac’s thought. Included within this grace-
nature discussion will be fundamental contemporary themes, particularly the nature of 
the secular, theology of gift, the centrality of paradox and the structure of teleology. 
 
                                                          
2 John Milbank, The Suspended Middle: Henri de Lubac and the Debate concerning the Supernatural, 
2nd ed. (Grand Rapids, Michigan: Eerdmans Publishing Company, 2014). In a substantial review of 
Milbank’s book, Edward Oakes comments, ‘…Milbank’s admiration for de Lubac seems ultimately 
grounded, at least as I read his text, in his insistence that de Lubac was really the first advocate, avant 
la lettre, of Radical Orthodoxy: “In effect, the surnaturel thesis deconstructs the possibility of 
dogmatical theology as previously understood in modern times, just as it equally deconstructs the 
possibility of philosophical theology or even of a clearly autonomous philosophy tout court.”’ See 
Edward T. Oakes, SJ, ‘The Paradox of Nature and Grace: On John Milbank’s The Suspended Middle: 
Henri de Lubac and the Debate Concerning the Supernatural’, Nova et Vetera 4(3) (2006): 667–696, 
here quoting 682. Oakes is quoting Milbank, The Suspended Middle, page 11 of the first edition and 
page 12 of the second edition. All further references to The Suspended Middle are to the second edition 
(2014). 
3 John Milbank, “The Programme of Radical Orthodoxy,” in Radical Orthodoxy? - a Catholic Enquiry, 
ed. Laurence Paul Hemming (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2000), 35. 
What is Radical Orthodoxy?4 
Whilst its concerns and claims have expanded and developed over twenty years, 
Radical Orthodoxy arguably began with the publication in 1990 of John Milbank’s 
ground-breaking and provocative Theology and Social Theology: Beyond Secular 
Reason.5 In this work, Milbank offers a stunning theological challenge to the standard 
thesis of secularization in the West that began around the sixteenth century. The 
standard thesis understands the secular to be a sphere of neutral and autonomous 
reason that developed through the simultaneous retreat of religion and theology, 
hence the common association of secularization with desacralization. So the clutter of 
theology and religion in antiquity and the Middle Ages was swept aside to reveal the 
cool, clear air of natural and autonomous reason. In this new secular world the 
question of humanity’s (or creation’s) ultimate origin and purpose is largely side-lined 
in favour of questions that concern the more immediate and immanent workings and 
functions of human beings and nature. Questions about the facts of nature were now 
divorced from questions of value or purpose. Desacralization sees the secular as the 
result of clearing away the debris of superstition, ritual and tradition that we imagine 
dominated mediaeval Europe in order to open new possibilities directed by the neutral 
hand of reason expressed most particularly in the natural sciences. The advent of the 
secular is therefore seen as the result of the inevitable progress of human knowledge 
and thinking. Moreover, desacralization is a negative thesis with its own theological 
assumptions because it assumes that what is real consists in an indifferent natural 
order to which is added a sense of the sacred. Therefore, sociology tends to regard 
Christianity not as the discernment of reality, but the addition of the sacred to an 
essentially neutral bedrock. The sacred is not intrinsic to the natural order and is a 
superfluous addition; desacralization is the process of its removal.6 We will see below 
that Radical Orthodoxy points to a direct connection between modernity’s invention 
of an autonomous secular sphere of the natural and a supposed natura pura to which 
is added divine grace. 
                                                          
4  For a more detailed introduction see Simon Oliver, ‘Introducing Radical Orthodoxy: from 
participation to late modernity’ in The Radical Orthodoxy Reader, ed. Simon Oliver and John Milbank 
(London: Routledge, 2009), 3-27; James K.A. Smith, Introducing Radical Orthodoxy: Mapping a Post-
Secular Theology (Grand Rapids, Michigan: Baker Academic, 2004). 
5  John Milbank, Theology and Social Theory: Beyond Secular Reason, 2nd ed. (Oxford: Wiley-
Blackwell, 2006). 
6  John Milbank, Theology and Social Theory, 9.  In important respects, Milbank’s thesis is in 
agreement with Charles Taylor’s seminal A Secular Age (Cambridge, Massachusetts: The Belknap 
Press of Harvard University Press, 2007). 
 Milbank rejects this view of the emergence of the secular from the ruins of the 
mediaeval consensus. The secular is not simply that which is left behind once we have 
rid ourselves of religion and theology. Neither is it a neutral, dispassionate or 
objective view of the world and ourselves; it had to be created as a positive ideology. 
The secular view holds its own assumptions and prejudices concerning human society 
and nature that are no more objective or justifiable than those of the ancient and 
mediaeval philosophers and theologians. It had to be instituted and imagined through 
theology, philosophy, politics and the arts. So Milbank’s crucial point is that the 
secular is not simply the rolling back of a theological consensus to reveal a neutral 
territory where we all become equal players, but the replacement of a certain view of 
God and creation with a different view which still makes theological claims, that is, 
claims about origins, purpose and transcendence. The problem is that this ‘pseudo-
theology’ is bad theology. Secularism is, quite literally, a Christian heresy – an 
ideological distortion of theology. 
 
The void opened by the advent of the secular is filled with many ideologies and 
philosophies that attempt to provide new metanarratives. The Enlightenment pursuit 
of neutral and objective reason, eventually distilled in modern philosophy and the 
natural sciences, is perhaps the most familiar, accompanied by the characteristic 
modern suspicion of tradition, practice and history and its devotion to ‘progress’ 
through the overcoming of the past. The late decades of the nineteenth century saw 
the pursuit of reason devoid of tradition and community begin to founder on the rocks 
of suspicion and scepticism. The logic of modernity finally reveals itself in the 
postmodern disavowal of the reality of truth and the reduction of philosophy and 
theology to the play of cultural and linguistic forces (hence Radical Orthodoxy’s 
tendency to refer to ‘late’ rather than ‘post’ modernity). In the midst of the remains of 
the so-called Enlightenment project and the contorted knots of postmodern 
philosophy and critical theory, Radical Orthodoxy detects an opportunity for 
theology. Whilst not a movement of reactionary nostalgia, Radical Orthodoxy seeks 
to recover the riches of ancient and high mediaeval Christian thought in order to 
confront the ideologies and confusions of late modernity. As such, it is in profound 
continuity with ressourcement writings of the twentieth century and, one might add, 
the earlier Anglican Tractarian movement of the nineteenth century. At the instigation 
of figures such as John Keble, E.B. Pusey and John Henry Newman, the Tractarian 
renewal first returned the Church to the sources of orthodox patristic theology through 
a host of new translations of ancient texts. This was paralleled in de Lubac’s 
establishment, with Jean Daniélou and Claude Mondésert, of the Sources chrétiennes 
series in the early 1940s. In short, the church was to recover itself by recovering its 
proper theology and philosophy, and its understanding of the dynamic inheritance of 
faith.  
 
In returning to the riches of Christian thought prior to modernity, Radical 
Orthodoxy’s method lies between the genealogical approach of late modern 
philosophy and the ressourcement theology of de Lubac and his confrères.  The 
realisation that concepts are not fixed and timeless but have complex histories and 
contexts informed the various genealogical methods of nineteenth and twentieth 
century philosophers, notably Nietzsche and Foucault. The method of genealogy – 
tracing the origins and fluctuating histories of concepts – has become characteristic of 
Radical Orthodoxy, with writings focused on topics and discourses beyond the 
restricted purview of modern theology: nihilism, repetition, the city, motion, music, 
work and the gift, to name but a few. This approach refuses to accept the fixed 
disciplinary boundaries of modern academic discourse and reflects the traditional 
Thomist view that theology does not have a strictly defined subject matter, but is 
about all things in relation to God. 7  De Lubac’s ressourcement was similarly 
concerned with tracing the history of theological concepts in opposition to the 
ossifying tendencies of neoscholasticism. Uncovering shifts in the understanding of 
nature and grace, the interpretation of scripture, and the meaning of corpus mysticum 
and corpus verum are three obvious examples. Nevertheless, as some commentators 
have pointed out, Radical Orthodoxy’s ressourcement extends beyond the immediate 
concerns of the Church’s self-understanding and it is an extension of the project of la 
nouvelle théologie. As Milbank writes, 
 
Is ressourcement enough? Is it enough to recover, after de Lubac, and many 
others, an authentic paleo-Christianity? Clearly not, and clearly the thinkers of 
                                                          
7 It has been noted that Radical Orthodoxy has extended the application of Christian ontology well 
beyond de Lubac’s concerns. See, for example, Bryan C. Hollon, Everything is Sacred: Spiritual 
Exegesis in the Political Theology of Henri de Lubac (Eugene, OR.: Cascade Books, 2008), chapters 6 
and 7. 
the nouvelle théologie thought of ressourcement as but the prelude to a new 
speculative and constructive effort. It is, in a sense, the task of this ‘next 
phase’ which Radical Orthodoxy has sought to take up, though in a wider 
ecumenical context.8 
 
Radical Orthodoxy’s return to the sources is focused on the recovery of a particular 
Christian ontology: the metaphysics of participation.9 It is the loss of the centrality 
and meaning of creation’s participation in God in the late Middle Ages that 
inaugurated the rise of the secular and the notion of an autonomous sphere of 
existence standing alongside God that would eventually become the natura pura. 
What is meant by ‘participation’? 
 
The metaphysics of participation is more fundamental than a vague notion of ‘joining 
in’ or ‘taking part’; it is the doctrine of creation that enables the clear elucidation of 
the communio ecclesiology characteristic of la nouvelle théologie. The nature of 
participation in Christian theology can be explained through Aquinas’s distinction 
between existence that is per essentiam and existence that is per participationem – by 
essence or by participation.10  Whereas God exists in himself essentially, all that is not 
God – everything from angels to stones – exists only by participation in God. Aquinas 
writes: 
 
Every thing, furthermore, exists because it has being. Consequently, a thing 
whose essence is not its being is not through its essence, but by participation 
in something, namely, being itself. But that which is through participation in 
something cannot be the first being, because prior to it is the being in which it 
                                                          
8 John Milbank, ‘The Grandeur of Reason and the Perversity of Rationalism: Radical Orthodoxy’s first 
decade’ in The Radical Orthodoxy Reader, 373. 
9 See Milbank, Pickstock and Ward, eds, Radical Orthodoxy, 3: ‘The central theological framework of 
radical orthodoxy is ‘participation’ as developed by Plato and reworked by Christianity, because any 
alternative configuration perforce reserves a territory independent of God.’ Catherine Pickstock’s 
recent discussion of repetition includes a crucial and complex analysis of the paradoxical Platonic 
notion of participation in the Same and the Different. A detailed discussion of this book is beyond the 
scope of the present essay, except to remark on the depth of Pickstock’s new reflections on the 
metaphysics of participation. For example, creatures are both the same as themselves and yet, in 
constantly exceeding (or non-identically repeating) themselves in the dynamism of their existence, they 
are different. This participation in the Same and the Different (concepts traceable to Plato’s Timaeus) 
is, in a sense, the bedrock of time’s participation in eternity. See Pickstock, Repetition and Identity 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013), 51-53. 
10 Aquinas, Summa Theologiae, 1a.3.4.responsio; Summa Theologiae, 1a.4.3.ad 3. 
participates in order to be. But God is the first being, with nothing prior to 
Him. The essence of God, therefore, is His own being.11 
 
What this amounts to is a crucial claim: there is only one real existent, and that is 
God.12 When God creates, there are not suddenly two foci of being or two ‘things’, 
God plus creation. Creation does not stand alongside God or even ‘outside’ God. 
Crucially, in no sense is creation autonomous because creation is, at every moment, 
ex nihilo. It is suspended over the nihil, held in existence by participating in existence 
itself. So creation has no existence that is self-standing and properly its own. Rather, 
it receives its being at every moment from an infinite and gratuitous divinity. 
Creation’s existence is, in this sense, ‘improper’. Yet even the very participation of 
creation in God is ‘improper’ to creation; it does not belong to creation by right or 
power, but is always the gratuitous gift of God. 
 
There is an important corollary of this metaphysics of participation: the difference 
between God and creatures is not like the difference between creatures. Whereas my 
difference from the table at which I am sat belongs both to the table and me because 
we have material natures that define the respective boundaries of our spatial 
existence, the difference between a creature and God is instantiated purely by God’s 
gratuity. To put the matter another way, God grants creation its own autonomy – its 
own otherness from God’s being – yet paradoxically this is no autonomy at all.  To 
put the matter another way, God ‘holds’ creation as other than himself. This 
ontological difference is a sheer difference that Aquinas expresses in terms of the 
simplicity of divine being (essence and existence are one and the same) and the 
structure or composition of created being (essence and existence are united but really 
distinct). Moreover, the nature of this participation is analogical in the sense that all 
creatures are held together by their relation to a common focus in God, even amidst 
their countless and immeasurable differences. 
 
Another important consequence of the metaphysics of participation that will become 
important in the discussion of de Lubac’s view of nature and grace concerns 
                                                          
11
 Aquinas, Summa Contra Gentiles, I.22.9 (my emphases). Unless otherwise indicated, translations of 
Aquinas are my own. 
12 Of course, this is directly traceable to Plato’s allegory of the sun in Republic VI: everything exists 
by participation in the Good. 
causation. Just as there can be no ‘competition’ or ‘contrast’ between divine existence 
and creaturely existence because they are fundamentally different, so there can be no 
‘competition’ between divine causation and creaturely causation. The Liber de Causis 
(‘The Book of Causes’), a Neoplatonic work upon which Aquinas wrote an important 
commentary, begins by stating that ‘Every primary cause infuses its effect more 
powerfully than does a universal second cause.’13 This means that God, as first cause, 
is the very foundation of all causation within creation. Within creation, we can 
delineate a hierarchy of causes for any event. For example, what causes the football 
team to win a match? The players? The coach? The fans? The club’s owner? In a 
sense, they are all causes, but in different ways.14 There is, however, a fundamental 
difference between creaturely or ‘secondary’ causation and divine or ‘primary’ 
causation: the primary cause is universal, the origin of existence, the source of all 
other causes and therefore infuses itself most deeply in things.15 To put the matter 
simply, God is not a cause amongst causes, one agent amongst many, but the very 
basis of all causation. Crucially, because divine primary causation and creaturely 
secondary causation are of a completely different order, they do not compete with or 
displace each other. Rather, the latter participates in the former.16 An action need not 
be God’s or mine; it can truly be both. So participation in God’s primary causation 
does not render secondary causes purely instrumental or determined. Secondary 
causes within creation are real and potent.17 As we will see, the blending of primary 
and secondary causes is also the blending of grace and nature. This has the important 
implication that grace is not a miracle.18 A miracle occurs when secondary causes – 
that is, natural causes – are removed to leave only the divine primary cause. Grace, on 
the other hand, involves the blending of causes both divine and natural; they are not 
                                                          
13 Thomas Aquinas, Commentary on the Book of Causes, trans. Vincent A. Guagliardo, OP, Charles R. 
Hess, OP, and Richard C. Taylor (Washington, D.C.: The Catholic University Press of America, 1996), 
5. All references are to the page numbers in this edition. 
14 See Aquinas, Summa Contra Gentiles, III.70. 
15 Aquinas, Commentary on the Book of Causes, 8: ‘But the activity by which the second cause causes 
an effect is caused by the first cause, for the first cause aids the second cause, making it to act. 
Therefore, the first cause is more a cause than the second cause of that activity in virtue of which an 
effect is produced by the second cause.’ 
16  Aquinas, Commentary on the Book of Causes, 132: ‘Now, whatever abundantly participates a 
characteristic proper to some thing becomes like it not only in form but also in action. ... Because form 
is the principle of action, everything that acquires its action from an abundant participation of the 
infusion of a higher agent must have two actions: one according to its proper form, another according 
to a form participated from the higher agent, as a heated knife cuts according to its proper form but 
burns insofar as it is heated.’ (my emphasis). 
17 For Aquinas’s account of providence and divine causation, see Summa Theologiae 1a.22. 
18 John Milbank, The Suspended Middle, 25. 
mutually exclusive. Jacob Schmutz, in an important essay on the changing views of 
causation beginning in the fourteenth century and the concomitant rise of the concept 
of natura pura, points to the paradoxical nature of Aquinas’s position, focussing 
simultaneously on autonomy and dependence: 
 
Aquinas could indicate both the dependence and the autonomy of the 
creature’s being and action in relation to the Creator, on the one hand, by 
distinguishing them, through the doctrine of analogy, and on the other, by 
indicating the dependence by means of the doctrine of the essential 
participation of the secondary cause in relation to the first cause. Creatures can 
provoke movement or change, but they are not the adequate cause of them 
inasmuch as God is the immediate, active agent and giver of being…The first 
cause gives being, the secondary causes only determine it…19 
 
This means that, for Aquinas, the primary cause acts in the secondary cause by means 
of influentia or ‘influx’ into the secondary cause. This will become very important for 
understanding the blending of nature and the supernatural. 
 
Having sketched the basic lineaments of Radical Orthodoxy’s vision, we now turn to 
the key debate where its main proponents have found most consonance with de 
Lubac’s work, the relationship between grace and nature. 
 
Grace and Nature: The Paradox of Creation 
As Henri de Lubac observed, the debate concerning grace and nature that so 
dominated mid-twentieth century Catholic theology, whilst frequently focussing on 
the interpretation of Thomas Aquinas and the Thomist legacy, touched every aspect of 
Christian theology. Radical Orthodoxy has diagnosed with de Lubac the inherent 
dangers of separating existence into dual realms that stand over and against each other 
on a univocal plane, hence the desire to articulate the blended but distinct spheres of 
                                                          
19 Jacob Schmutz, ‘The Medieval Doctrine of Causality and the Theology of Pure Nature (13th to 17th 
Centuries),’ in Surnaturel: A Controversy at the Heart of Twentieth-century Thomstic Thought, ed. 
Serge-Thomas Bonino, O.P., trans. Robert Williams (Ave Maria, Florida: Sapientia Press, 2009): 203-
250, here citing 209-210. 
grace and nature.20 The wider debate concerning the supernatural is discussed in detail 
elsewhere in this volume. Our focus here is Radical Orthodoxy’s particular 
contribution. 
 
For de Lubac, the heart of the Christian mystery is paradoxical. Whilst it is the case 
that humanity could have a purely natural end, it is the case that humanity is created 
with a natural desire for the supernatural vision of God.21 Humanity’s natural ends are 
simply intermediate ends which are enfolded in our final end.22 It is this final end 
which defines human nature. De Lubac writes: 
 
For this desire is not some “accident” in me. It does not result from some 
peculiarity, possibly alterable, of my individual being, or from some historical 
contingency whose effects are more or less transitory…My finality, which is 
expressed by this desire, is inscribed upon my very being as it has been put 
into this universe by God. And, by God’s will, I now have no other genuine 
end, no end really assigned to my nature or presented for my free acceptance 
under any guise, except that of “seeing God.”23 
 
De Lubac sees that humanity’s desire for the supernatural, in not being accidental, is 
constitutive of human nature. Of course, the vision of God is connatural only to God 
and cannot be achieved by humanity’s natural power, even though the desire for that 
ultimate end is apparently natural. Following Aquinas, de Lubac insists that a natural 
desire of any creature cannot be frustrated without twisting and contorting that nature. 
So to frustrate humanity’s desire for the visio dei would be to confine humanity to an 
                                                          
20 Conor Cunningham, ‘Natura Pura, The Invention of the Anti-Christ: A Week with No Sabbath,’ 
Communio 37 (Summer 2010), 243-254, here citing 244. ‘There is a perennial temptation that haunts 
all thought, a temptation that is dangerous for most discourse, but terminal for theology, namely, to 
parse existence in terms of dualisms: transcendence/ immanence; natural/ supernatural; sacred/ 
profane; philosophy/ theology, and so on.’ Cunningham argues that only God could be a ‘pure nature’. 
21 Following Aquinas, for example in Summa Contra Gentiles, III.57.4: ‘Besides, it was proved above 
that every intellect naturally desires the vision of the divine substance, but natural desire cannot be 
incapable of fulfillment. Therefore, any created intellect whatever can attain to the vision of the divine 
substance, and the inferiority of its nature is no impediment.’ See also Summa Contra Gentiles III.59.1. 
However, de Lubac does not resort to arguments from authority. He is not interested in the possibility 
of a purely finite natural end of man (a possibility he readily admits), but the actual openness of human 
desire towards the infinite – the ‘restlessness’ of St. Augustine. 
22 John Milbank, The Suspended Middle, 25. 
23  Henri de Lubac, The Mystery of the Supernatural, trans. Rosemary Sheed (New York: The 
Crossroad Publishing Company, 1998), 54-55. See below for a more detailed discussion of teleology. 
endless suffering. So it seems that God is obliged to realise the beatific vision because 
the desire for that vision is innate in humanity’s nature and, in being innate, it must be 
fulfilled. 
 
But how could God’s realisation of humanity’s natural desire for the supernatural be a 
matter of grace – that is, a free gift – and, at the same time, of obligation? Milbank’s 
answer to this conundrum reaches to the heart of Radical Orthodoxy’s appropriation 
of de Lubac and the Thomist vision he espouses: 
 
…the traditional account of grace and the supernatural [that of Aquinas prior 
to his sixteenth century commentators] is ontologically revisionary. The 
natural desire cannot be frustrated, yet it cannot be of itself fulfilled. Human 
nature in its self-exceeding seems in justice to require a gift – yet the gift of 
grace remains beyond all justice and requirement. The paradox is for de Lubac 
only to be entertained because one must remember that the just requirement 
for the gift in humanity is itself a created gift.24 
 
Maintaining the paradox of grace and nature in this way is part of Radical 
Orthodoxy’s commitment both to creation as the gift ex nihilo and also to the 
metaphysics of participation. How? We saw above that the difference between God 
and creation is not like the difference between creatures; it is not symmetrical. God 
establishes creation as other than himself. The difference between God and creation is 
itself a gift. Importantly, creation’s participation in God is not proper to creation; God 
grants to creation a participation in his own substantiality. So it is not the case that 
creation establishes itself as ‘other’ than God and then becomes the subject of God’s 
gratuity because creation is, in itself, nothing. To put the matter another way, 
creation’s ability to receive the gifts of God is itself a gift. There is nothing that stands 
outside this economy of divine gratuity. What creation has is genuinely its own, but 
what belongs to creation is always a gift. To return to the matter of grace and nature, 
for Milbank, following de Lubac, the innate and natural desire of humanity for the 
beatific vision does not constitute an obligation which is external to God, lying 
outside the divine economy of gratuitous creation, because that desire also finds its 
                                                          
24 Milbank, The Suspended Middle, 35. 
ultimate source in God. Of course, that natural desire for the supernatural is genuinely 
the creature’s own, but its ultimate first cause is God. Humanity’s just requirement for 
the genuinely new second gift of grace which will bring humanity to the beatific 
vision must be understood as ‘beyond all justice and requirement’ because that just 
requirement emerges from a natural desire for the supernatural which is God’s first 
gift in creation. Put more simply, humanity renounces any claim upon God because its 
primary nature is receptivity to the divine gift, first of ‘being’ and secondly of 
‘beatitude’: ‘For who sees anything different in you? What do you have that you did 
not receive? And if you received it, why do you boast as if it were not a gift?’ (1 
Corinthians 4.7). 
 
The view that the natural desire for the supernatural is a gift of God, however, carries 
with it an obvious danger: it seems to turn everything into a matter of grace and rids 
human nature of any integrity. Of course, this is precisely the concern of those who 
maintain the need for a natura pura, namely the preservation of the gratuity of grace. 
Yet Radical Orthodoxy holds fast to the paradox of the natural desire for the 
supernatural. As we have seen, creation is the first gift of an existence that is other 
than God, while grace is the second and wholly new gift of deification in which 
humanity is united to God without losing creaturely integrity. The natural desire for 
the supernatural is ‘the gift of the bond’ between the first and second gifts, ‘negotiated 
by the spirit’s freedom.’25 So the natural desire for the supernatural is a ‘suspended 
middle’ (to coin von Balthasar’s phrase which is in turn borrowed from Erich 
Przywara26) that indicates the unity-in-distinction of the orders of grace and nature. It 
rests in a double paradox: creation is autonomous being and yet heteronomous gift 
whilst grace is the raising of human spirit, as human spirit, to be beyond human spirit. 
 
In a now famous letter to Maurice Blondel written in 1932, de Lubac asks, ‘This 
concept of a pure nature runs into great difficulties, the principal one of which seems 
to me to be the following: how can a conscious spirit be anything other than an 
                                                          
25 Milbank, The Suspended Middle, 44. 
26 Hans Urs von Balthasar, The Theology of Henri de Lubac: An Overview, trans. Joseph Fessio and 
Susan Clements (San Francisco: Ignatius Press, 1991), 14-15; Erich Przywara, Analogia Entis: 
Metaphysics: Original Structure and Universal Rhythm, trans. John R. Betz and David Bentley Hart 
(Grand Rapids, Michigan: Eerdmans Publishing Company, 2014), 290ff. 
absolute desire for God?’27 It is conscious spirit that stands in a suspended middle that 
cannot be simply a part of nature or purely a matter of grace. So what is ‘conscious 
spirit’? It is something natural and supernatural, human and divine. Following de 
Lubac, Milbank answers this question through a category that has been central to 
Radical Orthodoxy’s engagement with wider theology and philosophy, namely gift.28 
Spirit is conscious of continuously receiving itself as gift. This is more than a feeling 
of absolute dependence; it is the drive to know the source of what we are as recipient 
spirits who cannot fully command what is received because a gift must always ‘flow’, 
continually giving itself anew. The response is gratitude towards the mysterious and 
unfathomable source of an infinite gift. This establishes an important characteristic of 
the gift for Radical Orthodoxy, and Milbank in particular: reciprocity. Whilst Derrida 
theorises a pure one-way gift in which no return is possible lest the giver be tainted by 
self-interest, Milbank insists that for a gift truly to be gift it must be acknowledged as 
such. This acknowledgement takes the form of gratitude. The recipient offers a return 
gift: thanksgiving. So whereas, for Derrida, for a gift to be truly a gift it must be only 
one-way – from giver to recipient – and thereby totally selfless or purely altruistic, for 
Milbank the gift requires reciprocal exchange because the gift must be acknowledged 
as such. The recipient acknowledges the gift and reciprocates with gratitude to the 
giver. So gift, for Milbank, establishes relationship through reciprocity. 
 
Moreover, following the logic of de Lubac’s position, Milbank argues that natura 
pura fails to guarantee the absolute gratuity of grace because it conceives of grace in a 
way that is univocal with gifts within the created order. Donation within creation 
implies the gift of something to an already established recipient. Similarly, natura 
pura implies a recipient standing in purity outside the economy of gift prior to the 
receipt of any gift. How, asks Milbank, does this ‘pure nature’ receive this gift? Does 
it do so purely of its own volition, recognising and thereby receiving the gift by virtue 
of its own wilful power, a power kept in reserve beyond the gift? Indeed, if a pure 
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 Henri de Lubac, Mémoire sur l’occasion de mes écrits, ed. Georges Chantraine and Fabienne 
Clinquart (Oeuvres complètes, 33) (Paris: Cerf, 2001), 188. 
28  Milbank, The Suspended Middle, 49-52. Milbank’s interventions in the philosophical and 
theological debates concerning the gift have been crucial. See in particular Being Reconciled: Ontology 
and Pardon (London: Routledge, 2003); ‘The Soul of Reciprocity Part One: Reciprocity Refused,’ 
Modern Theology 17 (2001): 335-391; ‘The Soul of Reciprocity Part Two: Reciprocity Granted,’ 
Modern Theology 17 (2001): 485-507. See also Graham Ward, Christ and Culture (Oxford: Blackwell, 
2005), especially ch.2. 
nature is understood to stand outside the economy of gift in this way, it establishes an 
autonomy for the created order and a distance from God whereby humanity can 
wilfully require of God the gift of beatitude on the basis of its self-standing ‘pure 
nature’. According to de Lubac, this reduces to Pelagianism.29 Crucially, for grace to 
be truly gratuitous it must presume nothing, ‘not even creation’. 30  This is why 
creation ex nihilo is not the establishment of a natura pura to which grace is later 
added, but the expression of an eternal gratuity into which nature is always drawn, 
even from the moment of its being spoken into existence by God. This is what 
Milbank refers to as ‘gift without contrast’. There are modes or distinctions of gift and 
always the possibility of the genuinely new gift, but there is nothing lying outside the 
economy of divine gratuity against which it can be contrasted. 
 
Milbank gives de Lubac’s understanding of the gratuity of grace an even more radical 
reading. As we have seen, Aquinas’s neoplatonic understanding of causation involved 
the in-flowing, or influentia, of divine causal power into secondary causes in such a 
way that God is not simply one cause amongst others. 31  This has the crucial 
consequence that creation is not an object upon which God acts by means of the 
delivery of grace, but is the very instantiation of causation or ‘influence’. So rather 
than God acting on something through the delivery of grace, Milbank proposes that 
the correct Thomist view as followed by de Lubac is that the act of creation is at one 
and the same time ‘a gift of a gift to a gift.’32 God’s creation establishes a threefold 
order of gratuity: the recipient of the gift, the gift itself and the donation of one to the 
other. This seems to establish, however, a radically unilateral gift: God simply gives 
everything. 
 
So does this fatally compromise the gratuity of grace and the proper autonomy of the 
creature? Quite the contrary: this is the only way of preserving the sovereignty of God 
and the gratuity of grace. To understand why this is the case, we must recall that the 
                                                          
29 Milbank, The Suspended Middle, 50; De Lubac, The Mystery of the Supernatural, 48. 
30 Milbank, The Suspended Middle, 50. 
31  Schmutz, ‘The Medieval Doctrine of Causality’, 215-30. Schmutz describes the shift in the 
understanding of influentia away from the influx of primary causes into secondary causes towards an 
understanding of primary causes acting with or alongside secondary causes. The distinction is subtle 
but the latter understanding leads to a more flattened view of ‘causes amongst causes’ rather than a 
hierarchical view of causation in which the higher causes inhere in the lower causes and act not with 
them but in and through them. 
32 Milbank, The Suspended Middle, 96. 
difference between God and creation is not like the difference between creatures. 
Whereas the difference between creatures (for example, between two people) belongs 
properly to creatures because of their separate and autonomous substantial natures, 
the difference between a creature and God is itself a gift of God. In itself, the creature 
is nothing; it does not instantiate itself as other than God and thereby exert its own 
causal influence or claim. It is God who, in the act of creation, gives existence to that 
which is other, holding creation at a distance so that it can be creation. The nature of 
creation’s autonomy from God is therefore paradoxical: on the one hand, creation is 
autonomous because it is not God, whilst on the other hand this is no autonomy at all 
because creation’s ‘otherness’ is always due to God and his act of creation ex nihilo. 
 
Having received itself as the unilateral and all-encompassing gift of God ex nihilo, 
creation’s only response is to return itself in gratitude to the source of its being. A 
creature’s expression of its nature in its very existence is its return to, or desire for, 
God. Yet God does not receive anything because whatever God receives, God has 
already donated. So Milbank proposes a most profound paradox at the heart of the 
Christian doctrine of creation: ‘unilateral exchange’. 33  Whilst there can only be 
genuine reciprocity in the Trinity or between creatures, the apparently reciprocal 
exchange between God and creation is only ever a matter of God’s influentia by 
which creation is given the power of responding and returning to God. This 
guarantees the gratuity of grace because it refuses any pure natural autonomy that can 
be the basis of a claim by creation on God’s gratuity. In short, there is nothing outside 
the gift and no position from which creation can assert itself over and against God. On 
this view, grace is the genuinely new (yet always inchoately anticipated) gift arising 
from within the primordial gift of creation by means of God’s influentia. 
 
Throughout Radical Orthodoxy’s appropriation of de Lubac’s understanding of grace 
and nature, the paradoxical structure of Christian theology is made evident. Indeed, 
Aaron Riches sees this as the heart of the dispute with neoscholastic theologians such 
as Lawrence Feingold who defend the concept of natura pura.34 For many modern 
                                                          
33  This paradox is expressed in the Church of England’s Eucharistic liturgy with the use at the 
offertory of King David’s prayer dedicating the people’s gifts for the building of the Temple: ‘For all 
things come from you, and of your own have we given you.’ (1 Chronicles 29.14). 
34 Aaron Riches, ‘To Rest in the Infinite Altitude of the Divine Substance: A Lubacian response to the 
provocation of Lawrence Feingold and the resurgent attack on the legacy of Surnaturel (1946) – Part 
theologians, paradox is a sign of incoherence and confusion and must therefore be 
resolved. Something must belong either to the realm of nature or the realm of grace. 
As nature is relinquished it gives way to supernature in a kind of ‘zero-sum game’ – 
we have one or the other. For de Lubac, Christian theology is paradoxical in the sense 
that it is structured around both/ and, not either/ or. Creation is both other than God 
and nothing; Christ is both divine and human; spiritual creatures are both natural and 
intrinsically orientated to the supernatural; grace is both innately desired by nature 
and a wholly new gift. Paradox is not a logical contradiction to be overcome or a 
mystery that will be clarified on the far side of the eschaton. It is not a fog that will 
clear once further investigation has been undertaken or the concepts clarified. Paradox 
is not simply a function of language that could be resolved if only we sorted out our 
conceptual schemata, but is part of the highest reaches of metaphysics. The tension of 
paradox is itself (paradoxically) revealing. So it is only by holding together divine and 
human, grace and nature, faith and reason, sacred and secular, that the non-
competitive and blended structure of these concepts becomes apparent and each 
reveals the other.35 Milbank sees the paradoxical nature of metaphysics and theology 
as contrasted with modern dialectics that is associated particularly with the 
philosophy of Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel (1770-1831). 36  Put very simply, 
dialectical thought works through the proposal of thesis and antithesis that are 
resolved into synthesis. In short, dialectics overcomes all tension and resolves into a 
unity whereas paradox requires the maintenance of tension as intrinsic to the depths of 
created being. 
 
                                                                                                                                                                      
One,’ unpublished essay provided by the author, 32: ‘In this regard, the divide between de Lubac and 
Feingold concerns two distinct approaches to theological perplexity: the one sees theological perplexity 
as essentially internal to the paradox of the hypostatic union and the mystery of Christology – the very 
core of Christian thought and practice – while the other sees perplexity as a problematical failure of 
reason fully to understand faith, and thus an aspect of theology in need of resolution in the quest for 
systematic clarity.’ See also Part Two, 8ff. See Lawrence Feingold, The Natural Desire to See God 
According to St. Thomas Aquinas and His Interpreters, 2nd edition (Ave Maria University: Sapientia 
Press, 2010). 
35 See Rowan Williams’s recent reflections on the wider implications of paradox in The Edge of 
Words: God and the Habits of Language (London: Bloomsbury, 2014), chapter 5: ‘Advances in 
understanding come when both theoreticians and experimenters identify the oddity within ‘normal’ 
discourse and press its tensions a bit further – not with the aim of removing all tension but in order to 
find ways of holding it in a larger structure and discovering new tension at that level which in turn will 
generate further fruitful crises.’ (130). 
36 John Milbank, ‘The Double Glory, or Paradox versus Dialectics: On Not Quite Agreeing with Slavoj 
Žižek’ in John Milbank and Slavoj Žižek, The Monstrosity of Christ: Paradox or Dialectic? ed. 
Creston Davis (Cambridge, Massachusetts: The MIT Press, 2009): 111-233. 
The importance of paradox for de Lubac and Radical Orthodoxy can be understood in 
relation to the central paradox of Christian theology, the incarnation.37 Christ is fully 
divine and fully human, yet one person. How can the infinite dwell with the finite in 
one person? How can Jesus Christ be both God and man, and one person? Attempts to 
resolve this paradox – to decide that Christ is really divine or human – were rejected 
by the ecumenical councils of the Church. Asserting Christ’s essential divinity is 
known as Docetism while opting exclusively for his created, albeit exalted, nature is 
associated with the followers of Arius. At the same time, resolving the paradox by 
mixing or synthesising the divine and human natures of Christ results only in a hybrid 
whereby Christ is a separate third entity, neither human nor divine. All of these 
attempts at resolution fail because they do not do justice to the theological insight that 
only a single divine humanity can bring salvation. One the one hand, we are only 
saved by God’s grace; on the other hand, it must be a human sacrificial action that 
reconciles us to God because it is humanity that has estranged itself. So Christ must 
stand in a ‘suspended middle’ between divine and human, finite and infinite, by being 
both divine and human. Because these are not mutually exclusive univocal natures 
(they do not, as it were, compete for space in Christ), Christ is fully both. This 
paradoxical relationship between infinite and finite is mirrored in the paradoxical 
relationship between Christ’s body, the Church, and the world, as well as between the 
grace which Christ offers and the nature which always intrinsically desires that grace. 
The paradox of Christ, which seeks no synthesis or resolution, reveals implications 
beyond Christology in the paradoxical nature of metaphysics itself in which tensions 
give rise to tensions and there cannot be any final and complete analysis outside God 
in whom all opposites coincide.38 Whereas modern thought seeks mastery and control 
in terms of resolution, the philosophy and theology of antiquity and the Middle Ages 
understood paradoxical mystery to lie at the heard of a symbolic created reality which 
points, paradoxically, to a creator who lies beyond all image and symbol.39 
                                                          
37 The connection between Christological disputes concerning the relation between divine and human 
natures and the debate concerning nature and grace is drawn by Aaron Riches, “Christology and duplex 
hominis beatitudo: Re-sketching the Supernatural Again,” International Journal of Systematic 
Theology 14 (2012): 44-69. 
38  The term ‘coincidence of opposites’ belongs to the fifteenth century Cardinal, philosopher, 
mathematician and theologian Nicholas of Cusa (1401-1464). See especially his treatise De Docta 
Ignorantia (On Learned Ignorance) in Nicholas of Cusa, trans. H. Lawrence Bond, Selected Spiritual 
Writings (New York: Paulist Press, 1997). 
39  The most sophisticated account of the metaphysical implications of paradox in the Radical 
Orthodoxy genre can be found in Johannes Hoff, The Analogical Turn: Rethinking Modernity with 
 Grace and Nature: Some Implications 
 
For de Lubac, the debate concerning grace and nature had significant implications for 
the relation between faith and reason, the sacred and secular, and the Church and 
state. Likewise, Radical Orthodoxy has proposed the always blended but distinct 
realms of theology and philosophy as well as faith and reason.40 The neoscholastic 
concept of grace standing alongside a realm of natura pura mirrors an understanding 
of the Church standing outside the worldly and autonomous domain of the secular, 
delivering grace from outside according to the mechanism of its sacraments. The 
notion of a natura pura is coterminous with the modern establishment of the secular 
as a desacralized, autonomous and neutral order to which the sacred is added as an 
extrinsic addition.41 By contrast, for de Lubac grace is not an extrinsic power applied 
to autonomous nature. The natural desire for the supernatural means that grace works 
by the divine influentia in nature. De Lubac outlines the implications of this vision in 
an early essay: 
 
The law of the relations between nature and grace is, in its generality, 
everywhere the same. It is from within that grace grasps nature, and, far from 
diminishing nature, raises it up, in order to make it serve its own ends. It is 
from within that faith transforms reason, that the Church influences the state. 
As the messenger of Christ, the church does not come to be the guardian of the 
                                                                                                                                                                      
Nicholas of Cusa (London: SCM Press, 2013). Hoff’s outstanding analysis focuses particularly on the 
mystagogy of Nicholas of Cusa and his notion of the coincidence of opposites. 
40 See, for example, John Milbank, Beyond Secular Order: The Representation of Being and the 
Representation of the People, Oxford: Wiley-Blackwell, 2013, ch.1; Catherine Pickstock, Repetition 
and Identity, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013. For an account suitable for students, see Andrew 
Davison, The Love of Wisdom: An Introduction to Philosophy for Theologians, London: SCM Press, 
2013 and Andrew Davison (ed.), Imaginative Apologetics: Theology, Philosophy and the Catholic 
Tradition, London: SCM Press, 2011. For a very closely related understanding of the relation between 
theology and philosophy, see D.C. Schindler, The Catholicity of Reason (Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans 
Publishing Company, 2013). 
41
 See, for example, Henri de Lubac, The Drama of Atheist Humanism, trans. Edith M. Riley et al (San 
Francisco: Ignatius Press, 1995); Henri de Lubac, Theology in History, trans. Anne Englund Nash (San 
Francisco: Ignatius Press, 1996), Part 2 section III. See also Adrian Pabst, Metaphysics: The Creation 
of Hierarchy (Grand Rapids, Michigan: Eerdmans Publishing Company, 2012), 311-312. 
state; on the contrary she ennobles it, inspiring the state to be Christian and 
thereby more human.42 
 
The understanding of grace grasping nature from within is a clear rejection of what de 
Lubac calls the ‘extrincist’ understanding of grace that can be seen in the writings of 
early modern thinkers such as Michael Baius (1513-1589) and Cornelius Jansenius 
(1585-1638) and brought to fruition in the theology of neoscholasticism.43 The idea 
that grace is an extrinsic addition to an autonomous natural realm issues in an 
understanding of the Church as an institution standing outside the world, shoring up 
its own boundaries and becoming one influence amongst other institutional influences 
over an autonomous ‘pure’ secular domain.44 Following Aquinas, for whom grace is 
not ‘extraneous’, de Lubac sees that faith transforms reason from within whilst the 
Church is not an agency external to secular civic society which delivers grace from 
without. Rather, it builds up true society from within. For Milbank, viewing the 
Church as the extraneous source of grace leads to a sense that it is just another locus 
of power wielded within and over the world rather than the means of pointing to, 
orientating and perfecting an already present natural and created drive towards 
transcendence.45 
 
This approach to nature and grace has further implications for the understanding of 
theology’s relation to other modes of intellectual enquiry and investigation. Does 
theology wield a kind of extraneous power over other disciplines somewhat analogous 
to an extrinsicist view of grace? It is often assumed that Radical Orthodoxy has a 
triumphalist attitude to disciplines beyond the boundaries of theology that entails the 
extraneous judgement or ‘placement’ of non-theological modes of reason. We might 
                                                          
42 ‘La loi des rapports entre la nature et la grâce est, dans sa généralité, partout la même. C'est par le 
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par là, plus humain.’ Henri de Lubac, ‘Le pouvoir de l'Église en matière temporelle,’ Revue des 
Sciences Religieuses, 12, 1932: 329-354, here citing 343-344. 
43 See Henri de Lubac, Augustinianism and Modern Theology, trans. Lancelot Sheppard (New York: 
Crossroad, 2000), chs. 1-3. 
44 For a helpful and succinct account of de Lubac’s rejection of ‘political Augustinianism’ which 
radically separated Church from state, see David Grumett, “Henri de Lubac: Looking for Books to 
Read the World,” in Ressourcement: A Movement for Renewal in Twentieth-Century Catholic 
Theology, ed. Gabriel Flynn and Paul D. Murray (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012): 236-249. 
45 Milbank, The Suspended Middle, 23. 
even think that, in the end, all intellectual pursuits should be regarded as different 
modes of theology, answering to the external power of its canons of authority and 
reason. This, however, is certainly not Radical Orthodoxy’s position and this can be 
shown through its appropriation of de Lubac’s basic theological sensibility. If one 
regards nature as intrinsically orientated to the divine and human nature (including its 
various modes of intellectual enquiry) as innately desirous of the vision of eternal 
truth, this implies that all modes of human investigation harbour an intrinsic thrust 
towards the knowledge of God via the particular knowledge of other things. This is 
why Aquinas can appropriate pagan Aristotelian metaphysics and natural philosophy 
to produce a synthesis with the Neoplatonic tradition, all under the interpretative 
authority and orientation of the Church’s holy teaching. Just as grace perfects nature, 
so Christian theology turns the water of pagan philosophical learning into the wine of 
Christian theology.46 It is not that theology acts extraneously as just another mode of 
intellectual enquiry that must be victorious over other disciplines in a battle for 
superiority. Rather, theology operates as that mode of reason orientated always 
towards transcendence and yet lacking any specific subject matter. It works, as it 
were, within human enquiry to perfect our investigations in pointing to the ultimate 
goal of all enquiry in a singular and transcendent source of truth. Theology might also 
identify erroneous theologies or metaphysics lying behind certain disciplines, and this 
has certainly been one of Radical Orthodoxy’s defining tasks. 47  So human 
investigation of the created order by means of natural philosophy (later becoming the 
natural sciences) is prompted by the sense that new discoveries orientate us towards a 
transcendent truth. This is why de Lubac could take a very positive approach to 
theological dialogue with science, including (with Teilhard de Chardin) the 
exploration of evolutionary theory.48 Nevertheless, following the Thomist tradition, 
we cannot understand such wonder and exploration as simply a matter of 
epistemological curiosity; as Milbank makes clear, it is part of creation’s basic 
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47 Aside from Milbank’s critique of the social sciences in Theology and Social Theory and Pickstock’s 
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ontological orientation to a divine end in which every creature is united to God after 
the manner of its own nature.49 
 
Grace and Nature: The Final End 
As we have seen, much of the debate surrounding grace and nature concerns the 
relation of divine action, creaturely causation and humanity’s ultimate end. According 
to Radical Orthodoxy, the idea of a purely natural end only arises once teleology is 
eclipsed in early modernity. 50  More specifically, a shift occurs in the way that 
teleology is understood. So what is teleology and how does this affect the debate 
concerning grace and nature that so embroiled de Lubac?51 
 
Teleology refers to the study of final causes – the purpose or goal of a particular 
action or event. Typically, a teleological description will use phrases such as ‘in order 
to’ or ‘for the sake of’. For example, I go to the shop to buy a drink in order to quench 
my thirst. What causes me to go to the shop is the telos of quenching my thirst. For 
ancient and medieval philosophers and theologians, the whole of nature is 
teleologically ordered.52 The bird has wings in order to fly. The man runs in order to 
get fit. The child prays in order to become closer to God. In the modern period, 
however, the notion of final causes came under significant attack, particularly from 
natural philosophers such as Francis Bacon (1561-1626) and René Descartes (1596-
1650). It was clear, they thought, that teleological orientation, if there is such a thing, 
belongs only to human beings because human action is intentional and purposive. A 
person can deliberate and plan so that certain goals are achieved whereas wider nature 
works by efficient causation and mechanism. To the extent that artefacts and human 
systems (chairs, cars, the postal system) are the outcome of human intentional 
planning, they too are orientated towards certain ends and might therefore be 
classified as teleological. However, the teleological orientation of something like a 
chair is not intrinsic. It does not belong to the chair per se as a material object. Rather, 
the teleological orientation of the chair (the act of sitting) emerges from the chair’s 
                                                          
49 Milbank, The Suspended Middle, 26-27; see Aquinas, Summa Contra Gentiles, III.25. 
50 Milbank, The Suspended Middle, 21. 
51 For a more detailed account of this shift in the understanding of teleology, see Simon Oliver, 
“Aquinas and Aristotle’s Teleology,” Nova et Vetera 11(2013): 849-870. 
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chance….Therefore, the divine goodness is the end of all things.’ 
designer and the person who uses it. In other words, the teleological orientation of the 
chair is extrinsic – it lies outside the chair, in its designer or user. 
 
So we arrive at an important distinction in the modern understanding of teleology: an 
end can be intrinsic or extrinsic. Insofar as the goal of a creature is an expression of 
that creature’s intrinsic nature – or, to put it in more precise Aristotelian terms, its 
blend of form and matter – the goal is intrinsic or innate. When the goal does not 
belong to a creature but is applied from elsewhere, for example by the designer of an 
artefact such as a table, it is extrinsic. The rejection of ‘real natures’ or ‘form’ in the 
increasingly mechanistic natural philosophy of the seventeenth century suggested that 
there were no genuinely intrinsic ends, except perhaps in the case of human intention. 
Matter came to be understood as passive and something to which one could 
subsequently add a goal or purpose.53 So just as the teleology of a car is extrinsic and 
donated to the material by a human designer, so the teleological orientation of nature 
was first and foremost extrinsic, being granted by God the creator. God comes to be 
understood as a designer according to an analogy with human designers of artefacts, 
hence the growing popularity of the design argument for God’s existence based on the 
concept of extrinsic teleology. Meanwhile, any attribution of intrinsic teleology to the 
natural realm, and particularly to inanimate objects, is merely a case of 
anthropomorphic projection. We only see purposiveness in nature because we humans 
are (uniquely) purposive creatures who are apparently less restricted by irrational 
animal instinct. In fact, there is no intrinsic purpose in nature; it works by simple 
material mechanisms orientated towards certain functional ends given by the divine 
designer. Modernity therefore marks the rejection, first and foremost, of intrinsic 
teleology. Extrinsic teleology, in which purposes are layered on top of a passive 
material nature according to a design, is preserved insofar as it is consistent with a 
more fundamental mechanistic cosmology. 
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How does this compare with pre-modern understandings of final causation? For 
Aristotle there is no dualism of intrinsic and extrinsic teleology. Human intentionality 
is just another instance of the wider intrinsic thrust of all things towards their 
particular ends or goals, and eventually towards the Good. For Aristotle, the end or 
goal of something is already given by its form; he says clearly ‘the form is the final 
cause’. To be a heavy object is simply to be orientated towards a low place in the 
cosmos. To be a bird simply is to be orientated towards flight. To be an acorn is to be 
orientated towards becoming an oak. To be a human being simply is to be orientated 
towards God. The form contains potentially that which is fully actualised in the 
achievement of something’s telos. For example, the oak tree is contained potentially 
within the acorn. Crucially, the motion from potency to act in the achievement of a 
telos is the creature’s own. Yet blended with this intrinsic orientation is a creature’s 
continual striving to exceed its current state in moving towards a yet-to-be-achieved 
goal that lies as yet out of reach. As Aquinas puts it, ‘To desire or have appetency is 
nothing else but to strive for something, to stretch, as it were, toward something 
which is destined for oneself.’ 54  The creature, being receptive to the external 
actualising power of others, achieves its goal. So the intrinsic and extrinsic aspects of 
teleological orientation are always blended. Even in material human artefacts, the 
matter (for example, the marble of a sculpture) is not entirely passive and the 
teleology is not wholly extrinsic. By virtue of its substantial form, the matter is 
intrinsically orientated towards certain ends and not others – one can make a statue 
out of marble but not a coat. 
 
Returning now to the relationship between grace and nature, it is possible to see that 
the neoscholastic position opposed by de Lubac requires a strict distinction between 
intrinsic and extrinsic teleology. A natura pura has an intrinsic orientation towards 
certain natural ends that are largely concerned with self-sufficiency and self-
regulation and hence come to be intelligible in mechanistic terms.55 To this is added a 
desire for the supernatural that is ‘elicited’ and is therefore extrinsic in origin, even 
though it comes to reside in nature. Thus there are two ends that run parallel, one 
intrinsic and purely natural (the things that are proportionate to human nature such as 
making dwellings and supplying food) and the other extrinsic and supernatural (the 
                                                          
54 Aquinas, De Veritate, 22.1 
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vision of God). 56 Yet it is not clear how, if at all, these dual orders relate. This means 
that the extrinsic supernatural end can be seen as an arbitrary and unintelligible 
addition to the purely natural and self-sufficient ends of humanity. The supernatural 
end becomes a focus for superstition and it leaves behind a largely autonomous 
‘secular’ realm of the purely natural.57 
 
For de Lubac, humanity’s orientation towards the supernatural is natural in the sense 
of being an intrinsic or innate desire; it is extrinsic because it is an orientation to what 
is transcendent that is achieved only through the second gift of grace. It is by grace 
that God enables the human creature to be moved and to move towards a supernatural 
end. In other words, the teleological motion towards God is both God’s and genuinely 
the creature’s own, made ‘sweet and delightful’, as Aquinas puts it, by God’s grace.58 
For de Lubac and Radical Orhtodoxy, the very form of humanity is always a 
teleological orientation towards the beatific vision: ‘My finality, which is expressed 
by this desire [for the vision of God], is inscribed upon my very being as it has been 
put into this universe by God.’ 59  The key point of dispute concerns the more 
exclusively extrinsic nature of human teleology conceived by neoscholasticism. For 
Reinhard Hütter, for example, the second gift of grace begins by initially ordering the 
first gift of created human nature to a supernatural end (an end it did not previously 
have in any guise) and then perfecting that nature in beatitude.60 So both acts are, as it 
were, extrinsically ordering human nature to a supernatural end in such a way that 
humanity becomes passive and its beatitude a matter of ‘design’. According to 
Radical Orthodoxy’s appropriation of de Lubac, the first gift of created human nature 
is always teleologically ordered to a supernatural end that is, paradoxically, beyond 
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all proportion to human nature.61 Blended with this intrinsic teleological orientation is 
the second gift of grace that brings that desire to fruition. As Aquinas puts it, ‘when 
[an] end is beyond the capacity of the agent striving to attain it…it is looked for from 
another’s bestowing.’62 
 
This emphasis on ‘form’ is open to an important objection articulated by Lawrence 
Feingold, whose position on the relationship between grace and nature is squarely 
opposed to that of de Lubac and Radical Orthodoxy. If the form is indeed the final 
cause, this implies that the addition of a new form known as ‘grace’ will also bring 
with it a new final telos. Feingold states: 
 
…we cannot conclude that because God has destined man for an end that is 
above his nature, such an end must therefore be a finality “imprinted on the 
nature” itself, or an “intrinsic” or “ontological” end, or an “essential finality.” 
All that we can conclude is that if God has eternally destined us to a 
supernatural end, it is fitting that he give a new form, “added on” to our 
nature, by which we are suitably ordered to that supernatural end. This new 
accidental form, which is sanctifying grace, must necessarily be above our 
nature, so as to make us proportionate to an end above our nature, connatural 
only to God.63 
 
Nicholas Healy points out that the texts to which Feingold appeals (Summa Contra 
Gentiles III.150 and Summa Theologaie 1a2ae.62.1) do not support the view that the 
addition of the form of grace provides humanity with a new final end.64 In the passage 
from the Summa Contra Gentiles, Aquinas is particularly concerned to argue that 
‘sanctifying grace is a form and perfection remaining in man even when he is not 
acting.’ In other words, sanctifying grace is not simply a force acting externally on the 
                                                          
61 The standard neoscholastic argument that over-extends the Aristotelian principle that ‘the end of 
nature must be proportionate to that nature’ seems to suggest that grace is a gift that renders nature 
proportionate to its supernatural end. It is not clear, however, that a created nature could ever be 
proportionate to the vision of God. The supernatural end is, rather, the deification of humanity that is a 
deepening participation in the divine life, not by proportion but by attribution. 
62 Aquinas, Summa Theologiae, 1a.62.4. responsio. 
63 Lawrence Feingold, The Natural Desire to See God According to St. Thomas Aquinas and His 
Interpreters, 321. See also 318. 
64 Nicholas J. Healy, “Henri de Lubac on Nature and Grace: A Note on Some Recent Contributions to 
the Debate,” Communio: International Catholic Review 35 (2008): 535-564, especially 560-561. 
human person; it is a power that becomes the person’s own and in which the person is 
settled through a transformed nature, not merely transformed activity. Form, for 
Aquinas, is complex and maybe qualified or added to. The addition of the new form 
of grace perfects natural form, it does not destroy it or supplant it. The basic natural 
orientation of humanity to its final end is qualified by the addition of a genuinely new 
form called grace: humanity is now able to move and be moved to its final end in 
response to its natural formal desire for that end. 
 
Healy and Riches, clarifying further the basic contours of Radical Orthodoxy’s 
appropriation of de Lubac, trace much of the dispute concerning grace and nature to 
different deployments of Aristotle’s maxim that ‘the end of nature must be 
proportionate to nature.’65 For neoscholastic theologians, this maxim applies both to 
the desire for an end and the power to achieve that end. Yet crucially Aquinas’s views 
of providence and grace include two elements: first, degrees of potency to a given end 
and, secondly, a hierarchy of ends in which the lower participate in the higher. So 
whilst there is a sense in which humanity is in potency to beatitude as its final end, 
that potency is radical (a passive potency) because it takes the form of a desire that 
cannot be fulfilled except by God’s grace.66 Yet at no point is humanity neutral or 
indifferent with respect to the vision of God. Therefore, it cannot be neutral or 
indifferent to the means of achieving that vision, namely grace. Meanwhile, humanity 
has two ends, one natural and another ultimate or supernatural. These ends are not 
parallel or separate. Rather, they are non-contrastive in the sense that humanity’s 
natural end is enfolded in the ultimate end of beatitude.67 For de Lubac, expounding a 
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text from Aquinas’s Summa Theologiae,68 humanity’s beatitude is twofold (duplex 
beatitudo). 69  First, we have an imperfect beatitude that belongs to this world. 
Secondly, we have a true and perfect beatitude that is the vision of God obtained only 
by grace even though that perfect beatitude is desired by nature. According to 
Aquinas, the first beatitude is associated with the contemplation of divine things that 
we find in ancient philosophy that indicates a desire for the vision of God possessed 
by the blessed that comes only by the grace of God in Christ. The desire that leads to 
the contemplative life is fulfilled – not supplanted – only in the vision of the First 
Truth, namely God.70 
 
For Healy, a key implication of de Lubac’s position on nature and grace is that the 
primary form of humanity is receptivity (following 1 Corinthians 4.7). 
 
If human nature desires a final end that exceeds nature, then the form of 
nature’s desire is receptivity – a receptive desire for the surprising and 
surpassing gift of friendship and assistance from another. This is supremely 
fitting for a nature whose very existence is from another.71 
 
The exemplary instance of this receptivity is Mary’s fiat in the incarnation. As Riches 
points out, this is also an affirmation of the doctrine of creation ex nihilo in which the 
first gift of created reality – the reception of being – is consummated in receptivity to 
theosis.72 The natural desire for the supernatural is therefore a recognition that the 
creature, in itself, is nothing and receives its being at every moment. This leads to the 
renunciation of any demand on God. It is not, however, a passive receptivity because 
it is also a positive yearning for the utterly gratuitous and unmerited friendship of 
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God.73 With an emphasis on receptivity as well as donation, this view supplements 
very effectively Milbank’s appropriation of de Lubac focussed on gift as a 
fundamental theological category. Milbank offers a more radical extension of de 
Lubac’s theology because the gift of grace and the receptivity of nature do not 
constitute only a theological anthropology and soteriology but also a doctrine of 
creation.74 Insofar as nature is teleologically ordered to the human person in such a 
way that creation is made for the intellectual spirit, the ends of all creatures are 
gathered up in the supernatural finis ultimus of humanity’s vision of God. 
 
Conclusion 
The extent of Henri de Lubac’s importance and influence over contemporary theology 
is demonstrated by Radical Orthodoxy’s thorough appropriation of his work. This is 
particularly the case with respect to the crucial debate concerning grace and nature 
that has been the focus of this chapter. More could be said about the importance of de 
Lubac’s Corpus Mysticum for Radical Orthodoxy and the centrality of the Eucharist 
for ecclesiology and language.75 A more thorough absorption by Radical Orthodoxy 
of de Lubac’s work on the theology of history and biblical exegesis remains in the 
future. 
 
It would be a misunderstanding, however, to think that Radical Orthodoxy simply 
picks up what de Lubac says about grace and nature in isolation. The alignment with 
de Lubac is possible because of more fundamental and basic agreements concerning 
the importance of ressourcement (particularly, for Radical Orthodoxy, the neoplatonic 
legacy), the interpretation of Thomas Aquinas, the understanding of philosophy’s 
relation to theology, and the basic structure of creation ex nihilo centred on the 
metaphysics of participation. It is clear that Radical Orthodoxy is not merely 
repeating de Lubac but regards his legacy as unfulfilled. 
 
                                                          
73 Healy, “Henri de Lubac on Nature and Grace,” 548. 
74 Lewis Ayres is right that what de Lubac (mostly) treats as matter of theological anthropology, 
Milbank extends to a doctrine of creation centered on gift. See Ayres, “The soul and the reading of 
scripture: a note on Henri de Lubac,” Scottish Journal of Theology 61 (2008): 173-190, here citing 183, 
n.23. 
75 See, for example, Catherine Pickstock’s use of de Lubac’s Corpus Mysticum in her After Writing: 
On the Liturgical Consummation of Philosophy (Oxford: Blackwell, 1998), 158-166. 
For some time now I have contended that Roman Catholic intellectual culture 
finds it very difficult, for institutional reasons, altogether to negate a false 
Tridentine legacy, and to pursue all the consequences of de Lubac’s 
theological revolution (a subversion as real as it was stealthy). An enterprise 
of ‘natural theology’…is perpetuated, along with a parallel discourse of 
‘natural law’ considered in an unThomistic way, apart from the law of 
charity.76 
 
For Milbank, there is still a tendency to delineate a realm of ‘nature’ lying beyond 
theology and the Church that remains ostensibly indifferent to a transcendent finality. 
In particular, he has pressed the political implications of de Lubac’s vision through an 
insistence that there is no ‘pure nature’ lying outside the economy of reciprocal gift 
and charity, an economy that can only be understood theologically on the basis of 
creation as gift. This means that worldly politics and economics, whilst tragically 
necessary in a fallen world, are only possible because of a more fundamental ontology 
of gift exchange. The postulation of a natura pura in any guise will simply perpetuate 
the violent power-play of modernity because there will be a contest (into which the 
Church is inevitably drawn) for control of that supposedly neutral sphere. 
 
Also, Radical Orthodoxy’s appropriation of de Lubac has implications for the 
understanding of the task of theology. With no natura pura, there is no sphere to 
which theology is indifferent. This means that de Lubac’s vision deconstructs the 
notion of an autonomous and self-enclosed Christian dogmatics that is focussed on a 
clearly delineated subject matter known as ‘revelation’.77 As natural theology is also 
rejected, so too is a purely autonomous philosophy. Whilst theology and philosophy 
remain distinct for Radical Orthodoxy (and strictly speaking not conflated as a 
‘philosophical theology’), theology requires philosophy’s original speculative 
structure and philosophy in turn is ordered to, and consummated by, theology. As von 
Balthasar states, ‘De Lubac soon realized that his position moved into a suspended 
middle in which he could not practice any philosophy without its transcendence into 
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theology, but also any theology without its essential inner structure of philosophy.’78 
With no strictly delineated subject matter such as the modern concept of ‘revelation’, 
theology looks different; it will always involve speaking about God by speaking about 
other things and in continual conversation with other modes of human enquiry that 
nevertheless enjoy their distinct subject matters and modes of enquiry. 
 
Central to Radical Orthodoxy’s speculative extension of de Lubac’s work, however, is 
the view that there is no pure nature lying outside gift. That gift, grounded in the 
doctrine of creation ex nihilo, is taken to a wholly new and unimaginable pitch in the 
deliverance of grace through Christ. The radical implications of this claim are 
explored in conversation with the Christian orthodoxy so beautifully expounded by de 
Lubac. 
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